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Abstract 
 
Punishment and Penal Activity: The Expansion of Legal Fines and Fees 
in Texas from 1985 to 2015 
 
Kevin Dahaghi, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisor:  Elizabeth M. Pettit 
 
Across the United States, legal fines and fees generate millions of dollars per year in 
revenue despite widening the net of criminalization and increasing penal severity for 
poorer individuals. Unlike in other penal policy domains, legal fines and fees represent an 
ambiguously defined form of punishment that has received bipartisan support. 
Understudied is how legal fines and fees have become an increasingly preferred policy 
choice among state-level political actors. In this study, I use archival data on legal 
statutes and legislative sessions in Texas – home to one of the largest prison and jail 
system in the U.S. – to investigate the development of legal fines and fees across a 30-
year period. I use insights from socio-political and legal theories to offer a comprehensive 
analysis of the structure of legislative policy networks and the development of legal fines 
and fees legislation. I demonstrate that both liberal and conservative political actors 
facilitated the passage of legal debt legislation. Furthermore, I consider the role of 
legislative testimony to show the association between testimony and the rate of 
 v 
legislation on legal fines and fees. I discuss the implications of my findings for 
understanding how policy networks and legislative activity are related to criminal justice 
outcomes and are influenced by a variety of social actors. My study contributes to 
theoretical explanations on the roles of state actors in developing policies that become 
increasingly implicated in social inequalities.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The American criminal justice system has expanded markedly over the past five decades, 
with more than 2.2 million people incarcerated and 4.7 million people under correctional 
supervision (Kaeble et al. 2015). These statistics, however, underestimate the full extent of the 
criminal justice system’s reach and impact. Court-imposed fines and fees have become an 
increasingly used legal instrument to both punish and hold individuals accountable. In Texas, 
2015 estimates suggest that municipal courts collected $696 million and justice courts collected 
$302 million in legal fines and fees (Office of Court Administration 2015), with revenues 
sometimes used to supplement state and local criminal justice budgets. Disproportionately 
impacting poor individuals, the recent upticks in the imposition of legal fines and fees subject 
disadvantaged individuals to an exacting form of punishment and surveillance in which minor 
cost amounts become subject to financial penalties, court supervision, and in some cases, 
incarceration. Against this backdrop, I explore the network relationships between legislators and 
whether interest group testimonies shape the statutes on legal fines and fees in Texas.  
Whereas recent work traces the historical origins and the contemporary consequences of 
legal debt for low-income individuals (Harris, Evans, and Beckett 2010), this study focuses on 
how and by whom legal fines and fees legislation is passed in present-day state legislatures. The 
ambiguity of legal statutes and the discretion of judges, clerks, and attorneys enable systems of 
fines and fees to operate with little accountability or supervision (Harris 2016). Beyond these 
street-level bureaucrats are the legislators tasked with creating the legal statutes. Despite a 
growing recognition that fines and fees can punish individuals beyond the intended purpose, 
legislators continue to propose and pass legislation that introduces new costs and increases in the 
dollar amounts of fines and fees (Jacobs and Helms 1999; Weaver, Hacker, and Wildeman 
2014). This motivates the question, through whose political involvement have systems of legal 
fines and fees developed and expanded over time?  
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I use legislative records to construct social policy networks that link state legislators to 
160 legal debt bills passed between 1985 and 2015. I use these data to identify key actors 
involved with the passage of legal debt legislation. Then, I incorporate archival data on the 
legislature, the correctional population, and the public opinion to investigate whether legislative 
testimony influences legal fines and fees policy. The findings underscore the incremental, but 
steady expansion of legal fines and fees in Texas, which is concerning for poorer individuals 
who may be more sensitive to potentially worse social, political, and economic outcomes. In 
doing so, this study extends socio-legal research by bridging scholarship on the development and 
consequences of criminal justice policy. Researchers have paid increasing attention to the 
harmful and pervasive effects of legal fines and fees with respect to the actors who enforce the 
law and the people who are impacted. Social network analysis and time series analysis provide 
important conceptual and methodological tools for illustrating the seemingly disparate links 
between various criminal justice actors who have cultivated a system of legal fines and fees 
implicated in growing racial and socioeconomic inequality.    
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
FACTORS AFFECTING LEGISLATION 
There are theoretical reasons to suggest that the development of legal fines and fees is a 
byproduct of relationships and interactions among legislators and other political actors. Prior 
research has effectively leveraged interviews and qualitative data to reveal the effects of legal 
fines and fees on individuals and communities. Legal debt holders describe fines and fees as 
contributing to cumulative disadvantage through reduced income, limited access to opportunities 
and resources, and an increased likelihood of ongoing criminal justice contact (Beckett and 
Murakawa 2012; Katzenstein and Waller 2015). However, less is known about what precedes the 
imposition of fines and fees, specifically the context in which fines and fees come to exist.  
 
The Role of Public Opinion  
The process of creating and passing legislation involves a myriad of factors. Although 
legislators ultimately author and vote on bills, there are numerous influencing forces, which 
include public opinion, partisan affiliation, fiscal concerns, and interest groups. Scholarship has 
theorized on the nature and predictors of public opinion on criminal justice policy. There are 
competing sociological explanations on whether and how public opinion affects legislative 
outcomes. Early political science research finds support that public opinion influences public 
policy (Page and Shapiro 1983). In line with this work, Peter Enns (2016) finds that politicians 
adopted tough on crime policies as a response to the public’s punitive attitudes. In other words, 
the punitive shift in public opinion led to a punitive shift in criminal justice policy, suggesting 
that politicians are perceptive to the demands of constituents. At both the federal and state level, 
evidence shows a positive association between public punitiveness and increases in incarceration 
rates, net of crime rates, income inequality, and other associated factors (Enns 2016). The 
evidence is incomplete, however, as its focus on the attitudes of median voters does not fully 
capture the public opinion of those who are most involved with the criminal justice system, 
namely, the poor and disadvantaged. Moreover, public opinion on crime policy is fluid, with 
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support for punitive policy changing over time and coexisting with support for more lenient 
policies (Beckett 1999).  
A series of studies suggest that political elites primed the public to develop and voice 
punitive attitudes towards crime following the civil rights movement (Beckett 1999). Katherine 
Beckett (1999) examined the politicization of crime around the mid-1960s to find that state 
actors’ claims making activities coupled with the mass media shaped public opinion on street 
crime and drug use. Specifically, state actors frame and politicize issues to imply necessary 
policy outcomes, which, in turn, mobilizes public support. One reason this is effective is that 
state actors have greater access to public forums and are viewed with legitimacy (Weiss 1979; 
Beckett 1999). Rooted in the politicization of crime were the politics of racial resentment 
(Murakawa 2008; Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013). During the 1960s, conservative politicians 
merged appeals for law-and-order with racially coded language that linked racially 
underrepresented groups with street crime (Murakawa 2008; Murakawa and Beckett 2010). This 
rhetoric used racial resentment to explain the declining socioeconomic position of the white 
working class, thereby mobilizing their support (Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013). Historical 
accounts on the politicization of crime suggest different directions for the relationship between 
public opinion and political actors; however, there is a clear association between conservative 
political leadership and increasing punitiveness in U.S. criminal justice policy (Jacobs and 
Jackson 2010).  
 
Hypothesis 1: Public opinion will be positively associated with the rate of legal fines and 
fees legislation. 
 
The Durability of Political Partisanship 
Unlike the role of public opinion, political partisanship is well understood to be a 
significant factor influencing policy development (Beck 2002; Kirkland 2011). Partisanship is a 
key signal on the nature and policy leanings of a legislator or legislative body (Christakis and 
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Fowler 2008). State legislatures are often understood in relation to their partisan makeup (Brace 
and Boyea 2008). Texas, for example, has had a Republican-dominated legislature for the past 
three decades, which partly informs its long-held “tough on crime” reputation (Gershowitz 
2012). In the policy arena, legislators must collaborate to craft policy and vote policy into law. 
For state legislatures consisting largely of Republican legislators, for example, this may demand 
that Democratic legislators work “across the isle,” (Fowler 2006a).  
Political parties employ tactics to signal partisan commitments and appeal to voter bases 
(Beck 2002; Beckett and Sasson 2003). Conservative candidates have relied on political appeals 
to crime control candidates to win (re)election campaigns, while Democratic candidates have 
struggled to endorse punitive policies (Brace and Boyea 2008). Within political parties, however, 
there exist ideological differences that guide attitudes towards punishment and other criminal 
justice policy (Jacobs and Jackson 2010). In other words, Republicans and Democrats are not 
monoliths, but have variation in their attitudes and actions on criminal justice policies.  
During legislative sessions, partisanship is consistently shown to be associated with 
cosponsorship and cooperation among legislators (Fowler 2006; Christakis and Fowler 2008; 
Kirkland 2011). Members of the same political party tend to cosponsor together and partisan tilts 
can influence entire policy domains (Kirkland 2011). Decisions to cosponsor and pass legislation 
are not only affected by relationships among legislators, but are also conditioned by the broader 
conversations and concerns of a given period (Kent and Carmichael 2015). Legislative sessions 
may be characterized by specific issues or bills most pertinent to the political landscape. The 73rd 
Texas legislative session in 1993, for example, focused much of its criminal justice policy on the 
funding and expansion of correctional facilities (Senate Research Center 1993). For comparison, 
the most recent legislative session (84th) focused on firearms, juvenile justice, and victims’ 
services (Senate Research Center 2015). In the 30-year period analyzed in this study, approaches 
to crime policy have varied, yet fines and fees have continued to be passed into law.  
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Hypothesis 2a: The proportion of Republican Legislators will be positively associated 
with the rate of legal fines and fees legislation.  
Hypothesis 2b: Republican governorship will be positively associated with the rate of 
legal fines and fees legislation. 
 
Fiscal Concerns 
In recent years, as the burgeoning costs of incarceration became clearer, politicians have 
converged in supporting a “smart on crime” approach (Simon 2010; Page 2011). The rhetoric 
around crime policy has started to lean towards rehabilitation and away from punitiveness. 
Rehabilitation is often coupled with the notion of accountability (Goodman 2012; Cullen and 
Gilbert 2013). Legal fines and fees stand in stark contrast to the most severe forms of 
punishment, such as incarceration, which require high costs during and after incapacitation. 
Instead, fines and fees reflect a desire to recoup the costs of criminal justice activity while still 
holding individuals accountable for lawbreaking activity (Beckett and Harris 2011). In certain 
contexts, efforts to promote rehabilitation and accountability can become forms of social control, 
whereby increased supervision and mandatory socializing activities are imposed. Stuart (2016) 
finds that Los Angeles residents were presented with opportunities to waive fines for public 
misconduct by enrolling in social services. 
For fiscally conservative politicians, fines and fees may be a puzzle; they are at once a 
form of taxation and a punishment seemingly commensurate to a given crime. How politicians 
come to understand and support crime policy may be related to the efforts of interest groups and 
their political involvement. Research has shown that certain actors may mobilize support for 
public policy that runs counter to a political groups’ traditional platform. In Texas, Campbell 
(2011) shows that legislators abandoned a traditional fiscal conservatism in favor of tough on 
crime legislation. Fiscally conservative legislators were convinced that expanding prisons would 
be less costly than not punishing violent criminals (Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013). Page (2011) 
argues that prison officer unions in California leveraged strong political influence to challenge 
efforts to downsize prisons, despite the necessity to do so for lowering costs.  In addition to the 
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influence of budgetary concerns, I anticipate that increases in the incarceration rate will 
contribute to increases in legal fines and fees legislation. Incarceration is a costly process for 
courts, prisons, and jails.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Budgetary concerns will be positively associated with the rate of legal 
fines and fees legislation.  
Hypothesis 3b: The incarceration rate (per 1000) will be positively associated with the 
rate of legal fines and fees legislation.  
 
Interest Groups and Testimonies 
Recent work has centered interest groups in socio-legal analyses of policy formation. 
Adopting an organizational “fields” approach, these studies have conceptualized interest groups 
as actors who occupy a fluid position between legislators and the public (Page 2011; Stuart 2016; 
Vargas 2016). In Texas, Campbell (2011) finds that law enforcement organizations were given 
significant influence on politicizing and shaping tough on crime policies. Conservative 
legislators leveraged law enforcement organizations for political endorsements, which gave law 
enforcement greater legitimacy to shape public perceptions of crime. Legislators often work in 
isolation from the public during sessions. Law enforcement organizations and other interest 
groups, however, typically have direct contact with the public, and thus represent a pathway 
through which the communication and dissemination of political attitudes occurs (Beckett 1999; 
Campbell 2012). As Campbell (2011) notes, “law enforcement organizations and their members 
provided a vital institutional link between the state-level penal policy arena, the media, and the 
public.” Law enforcement groups represent one side of political spectrum on crime policy. Court 
organizations, nonprofit organizations, and some testifying citizens also have a close social 
proximity to legislators. Whereas law enforcement organizations may have a vested interest in 
making crime policy more punishment-oriented, nonprofits may vouch for less severe forms of 
sanctioning. The socio-legal literature on legal fines and fees has yet to explore these 
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relationships. Legal fines and fees represent a middle ground between punitiveness and leniency. 
Some legal statutes have stated purposes for generated revenue that include supporting victim’s 
compensation and other public goods, thus making policies around legal fines and fees more 
palatable policy suggestions.  
The most visible form of political engagement among interest groups is public testimony. 
Although state organizations cannot take official positions on legislation, public testimony is 
often cited in legislative memos and communications (Christakis and Fowler 2008; Campbell 
2011; Carlson 2017). Agenda setting precedes the passage of legislation. Interest groups may be 
most impactful during this process by curating information and presenting on relevant social 
issues (Talbert and Potoski 2002; Carlson 2017). Similarly, politicians may relay information on 
social issues to interest groups in order to mobilize public sentiment and support (Campbell 
2011). Research on the role and embeddedness of interest groups is needed to ascertain how the 
social groups not directly tasked with creating legislation manage to have significant influence 
over legal statutes.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Testimonies will be positively associated with the rate of legal fines and 
fees legislation. 
 
EXPANSION OF LEGAL FINES AND FEES  
Systems of a legal fines and fees reflect a disciplinary approach to poverty management 
(Wacquant 2009; Beckett and Western 2011; Katzenstein and Waller 2015). Holding legal debt 
is particularly impactful for poorer populations. Although some legal fines and fees have trivial 
cost amounts, the legal statutes allow for a net widening effect whereby more people become 
entangled with the criminal justice system for minor offenses (Beckett and Murakawa 2012; 
Harris 2016). Many fines and fees are associated with misdemeanor or petty crimes (Texas 
Appleseed 2017). Perhaps an unintended consequence, legal statutes enable agents of the 
criminal justice system to penalize not only minor criminal activity, but also individuals’ 
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inability to manage debt (Weaver et al. 2014). Fines and fees make sanctions more severe. For 
example, the failure to appear in court for a $60 traffic fine can result in nearly $365 worth of 
added court costs and fees (Texas Appleseed 2017). The bulk of fines and fees sometimes relate 
to the expenses of criminal justice activities more than the crime itself. A significant contributor 
to the increased severity of punishments are the policy changes that raise cost amounts.  
Legal fines and fees, as part of the broader carceral state, are not presented as a clearly 
defined set of policies up for public debate. The outcomes of legal fines and fees legislation are 
documented, but the underlying political roots for their expansion is not. Gottschalk (2006) 
argues that, within larger institutional structures, punitive penal policies were implemented with 
little opposition. Whereas the legal statutes on other criminal justice processes such as 
incarceration are more forthright in language, statutes for legal fines and fees are ambiguous and 
consequently more prone to discretionary imposition. There are instances in which fines and fees 
can waived and/or there is a determination of indigency; however, the legal statutes are not clear. 
Using experimental evidence, Schram and his colleagues (2009) find that discrediting markers, 
much like holding legal debt, negatively influence officials’ decisions to impose sanctions. 
Fording and his associates (2013) find that welfare sanctions reduce the growth in wage earnings 
among TANF recipients, regardless of race. These studies are useful for understanding the 
variation in how sanctions are imposed and the subsequent consequences for receiving an initial 
sanction.  
Changes in fines and fees legislation has been steady and incremental over time. Early 
forms of legal fines and fees can be found in the southern U.S. states during the 1940s (Harris et 
al. 2010). In Texas, fines and fees have been introduced and amended during the popularity of 
crime control and since after. Other forms of punishment, particularly incarceration, have 
required omnibus legislation or large-scale changes. The system of legal fines and fees has been 
piecemeal, with specific fines or fees amended as part of other criminal justice or education 
related bills. This approach has made the growth of fines and fees more innocuous in nature, as 
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their impact cannot be traced to a single legislative bill or legislative session (Feeley and Simon 
1992). Therefore, legislators, interest groups, and the media may have been less attentive.  
Taken together, scholarship has produced detailed accounts of how legal fines and fees 
mark an increase of criminal justice contact and involvement. Yet, the legislative activity 
permitting fines and fees requires more investigation. While scholarship has explained the 
expansion of mass incarceration in legislation as a product of the combination of public opinion, 
state actors, and political rhetoric, there are few explanations for how the expansion of legal fines 
and fees is associated with political actors and legislative activity on the state-level. This study, 
however, expands the scope of inquiry to look at the legislators whose actions set the guidelines. 
While judges, clerks, and other legal personnel impose and enforce legal fines and fees, they rely 
on legal statutes to inform their decisions. State legislators directly author, sponsor, amend, and 
vote on bills establishing the types of legal fines and fees. Additionally, testimonies may 
contribute to whether a bill is supported. To better understand the expansion and persistence of 
legal fines and fees, it is crucial to illustrate legislative networks and assess the impact of 
testimony at the state-level. 
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Chapter 3: Data & Methods 
USING STATE HISTORIES TO UNDERSTAND PENAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
Research on the development of criminal justice policy in the United States has been 
challenged with understanding the interplay between federal-level, state-level, and local-level 
political structures (Lynch 2012; Campbell 2016). A distinct feature across all U.S. state 
governments is that there are casts of state actors that include governors, legislators, and interest 
groups. Moreover, state governments are directly responsible for creating criminal laws within 
the constitutional boundaries set forth by the federal courts. Given the rapid growth of 
imprisonment in the United States, a body of sociological research has examined penal policy 
change in the context of mass incarceration. Prior work on state-level trends in mass 
incarceration has contributed theoretical accounts of how penal control is complex, specifically 
paying attention to the dynamics and developments of both the federal government and state 
governments (Lynch 2012; Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013) and the conflict among competing 
groups for using finite resources (Page 2011; Goodman, Page, and Phelps 2015). 
Insights from this literature point to differences in the causes and consequences of 
various penal processes. In other words, what contributes to and sustains mass incarceration in a 
certain state during a certain period is different from the factors that do so for arrest, probation, 
parole, and other forms of punishment. For example, Phelps (2016) shows that during the growth 
of mass incarceration from 1980 to 2000, mass probation expanded as well, but in states such as 
Delaware and Minnesota. Her account challenges conventional arguments that punishment was 
and is historically concentrated in southern states. She suggests that probation is a unique form of 
social control, and not an alternative to imprisonment. 
In line with these theoretical perspectives, I argue that systems of legal fines and fees 
represent a unique arm of the carceral state. Legal fines and fees have been supported and 
expanded by state-level actors, but in different ways from more visible forms of punishment. The 
factors and forces predicting the expansions of other penal social control mechanisms, such as 
mass incarceration and mass probation, cannot be universally applied across states (Miller 2008). 
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Whereas support for mass incarceration has largely been attributed to certain social groups, such 
as conservatives and law enforcement organizations, legal fines and fees may have developed 
through broad support from those groups and groups that previously opposed mass incarceration 
and prison expansion.  
Scholars should begin from analyzing individual state histories where different state 
actors exercise varying levels of influence on penal policy (Miller 2008). To date, four case 
studies on American states offer detailed accounts on the roles of state actors. Schoenfeld (2010) 
demonstrated how in Florida, prosecutors and sheriffs rallied campaigns in support of prison 
expansion and against their opponents who advocated using parole to reduce prison 
overcrowding. Her work draws attention to the paradoxical nature of court decisions for which 
there were long-term consequences for prison expansion. Page (2011) used ethnographic and 
historical data to explain how prison guard unions in California gained political power and 
financial backing from prison expansion to push forth an aggressive approach to corrections. The 
unions were successful in blocking efforts to reform “tough on crime” policies. Further, the 
unions backed victims’ rights groups that were then used as political allies in the conversations 
surrounding penal policy. Lynch (2010) used archival and interview data to investigate how 
Arizona, a state with a history of low incarceration rates and an unwillingness to spend on 
corrections, came to have one of the highest incarceration rates in the United States. In part, she 
argues that political elites and the media used “tough on crime” rhetoric to mobilize support. 
Owing to the unique history of Arizona politics, she suggests that corrections became 
increasingly bureaucratic, which gave the state greater capacity to imprison large numbers of 
people. Campbell (2011) examined the politicization of “law and order” approaches to crime in 
Texas. He argues that law enforcement and prosecutor organizations were effective in lobbying 
to lawmakers and re-positioning reform efforts to support prison expansion and the 
intensification of punishments. A key process through which law enforcement organizations 
were effective was through bill tracking and testimony.  
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Although focused on mass incarceration and imprisonment, these studies provide 
important theoretical and methodological tools for using state-level case studies to examine the 
penal policy development of other criminal justice processes. Legal fines and fees have recently 
garnered attention and criticism in scholarship, but their development over time is largely not 
understood. The expansion of legal fines and fees is not the result of clearly defined legal 
policies or institutional structures. Whereas mass incarceration is viewed as costly and 
ineffective, legal fines and fees may be viewed as cost-efficient or less punitive. While research 
suggests that state political structures orient and shape the debate around penal policies, more 
work is needed to understand which individuals and groups are more impactful in the policy 
arena.  
 
THE ARGUMENT FOR STUDYING TEXAS 
Texas is a suitable state to study the relationship dynamics of legislators and interest 
groups for expanding legal fines and fees. Widely considered a “national leader in criminal 
justice reform,” Texas hosts one of the largest penal populations in the United States, with 
147,409 incarcerated and 318,371 under correctional supervision (Legislative Budget Board 
2017). The size and scale is evident in Texas’s criminal justice budget, for which the state spends 
roughly 3.4 billion annually (Texas Department of Criminal Justice 2016). The history of the 
legal fines and fees system in Texas can be tied to convict leasing systems in which southern 
prisoners were charged steep fines and fees and then leased to corporations for labor (Adamson 
1983). Figure 1 presents a timeline of relevant legislative activity on legal fines and fees in Texas 
in the past five decades.  
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Figure 1. Timeline of Major Legislative Activity on Legal Fines and Fees 
 
 
The provisions under which legal fines and fees could be imposed were amended into 
Texas state law in 1965 with the authorization of the warrant fee (Code of Criminal Procedure 
45.203). The warrant fee has since been increased to $25. Notably, these bills set the guidelines 
for responding to unpaid legal fines and fees by allowing the use of jail time as a penalty. In 
1979, the Texas Legislature passed the Crime Victims’ Compensation Act to promote the 
involvement of crime victims in the process of apprehending criminal offenders and receiving 
the necessary reimbursement for expenses related to the crime. The associated fund receives 
revenues from state court costs, parole supervision fees, donations, suborgation, federal VOCA 
grants, and restitution (Legislative Budget Board 2013). In 1985, the Code of Criminal Procedure 
was updated to match the language used in Vernon’s Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In 
1998, as part of a Senate Bill 1863, the Texas Legislature authorized a program designed to assist 
cities and counties with the collections of legal fines and fees, titled the “Collections 
Improvement Program” (CIP). The program launch signified an effort to incentivize legal fines 
and fees collections. The CIP made more formal the processes for collecting legal fines and fees 
and reporting on the details of collections, such as the numbers of cases and amounts owed. 
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Mandating that cities with populations of 100,000 or more follow CIP standards, the program 
directed more attention to the imposition of legal fines and fees around 2005.  
Recently, the media has cultivated widespread attention to legal fines and fees in Texas. 
In 2015, an investigation of courts in El Paso County brought attention to the issue of 
determining indigency (Taggart and Campbell 2015). In 9 of the 20 courts investigated, there 
was no evidence that the courts assessed whether individuals were impoverished and unable to 
pay legal debts. Later that year, the Texas Fair Defense Project filed a lawsuit against the city of 
Austin after a plaintiff was jailed for an inability to pay thousands owed in traffic tickets 
(Gonzales et al. v. City of Austin 2015). Conditions observed in Texas are effective for 
identifying the practices and legislative guidelines that effectively punish individuals, even in the 
absence of the local particularities seen in Ferguson and St. Louis (Department of Justice 2015), 
which have guided the national narrative.  
The institutional arrangement of the Texas Legislature is unique (Campbell 2011). In a 
typical legislative session, about 6,000 bills will be proposed and about 1,200 bills will be voted 
into law. Legislative sessions take place every two years for a six-month period where legislators 
meet to propose and vote on bills. Given the infrequent nature of legislative sessions, bills passed 
into law have immediate and durable impacts in the years before the next session. Moreover, this 
may suggest that agenda setting and interest group politicking takes place over a longer period 
leading up to a session. Although Texas has a regressive tax structure, there has been 
considerable support for introducing new legal fines and fees and amending existing fines and 
fees to increase costs. As shown in other states (Lynch 2010), support for punitive and costly 
penal policy is not always at odds with a state’s interests. There are currently about 143 unique 
criminal court costs (Slayton 2014). Legal fines and fees can be assessed at every court level 
within Texas, and costs can range from $2 for indigent defense to $133 for consolidated court 
costs. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN  
To understand the development of legal fines and fees policies, my analyses draw 
primarily on a combination of legislative records and archival data in Texas from 1985-2015. 
The primary data are legislative records available from the Legislative Reference Library of 
Texas (http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/) on 16 legislation sessions from 1985-2015. I select this period 
based on the availability of records needed for checking validity. Prior to 1985, legislative 
records are less consistent in their language across different online databases. Data from the 
online reference library were cross-checked with physical legislative records held in the Tarlton 
Law Library at the University of Texas at Austin. I include 160 legislative bills related to legal 
fines and fees in the Code of Criminal Procedure. I use the term “bill” generically to reference 
any piece of legislation. From the legislative records, I draw information on bill histories, 
legislative session characteristics, and testimony characteristics. Each legislative record includes 
drafts of the bill text, the legislative authors and sponsors, the legislators’ votes, the fiscal 
impact, and the witness lists. From the text, I can determine the (amended) cost amount of a legal 
fine or fee and its statutory purpose. I use data on the legislative authors and sponsors to 
construct social networks. I use online records from the Texas Senate, the Texas House of 
Representatives, three daily newspapers, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, and the Gallup poll to 
gather information on the macro-level predictors of legislation for the time series analysis.  
 
METHODS 
This study examines the Texas Legislature between 1985 and 2015 to identify the 
political actors involved with legal debt legislation and to assess the influence of legislative 
testimony. To gain analytic leverage on my research question, I employ two analytic techniques, 
each drawing on different subsets of the data. I conduct a social network analysis to descriptively 
map social ties among legislators on legal debt bills across a 30-year period. In doing so, I show 
that counter to social theory suggesting the actors in favor of punitive policy might favor the 
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expansion of fines and fees, the actors involved with fines and fees legislation are more diverse. I 
also test an alternate measure of centrality to assess the strength of legislator relationships. In the 
second stage of analysis, I employ Poisson regression to model the influence of testimonies on 
legal fines and fees legislation. Results demonstrate the relevance of testimony for increasing the 
rate of legal fines and fees legislation. Triangulating across data sources and different techniques 
offers insight into the interplay of various actors over time.   
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Chapter 4: Who Endorsed Legal Fines and Fees? 
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Social network analysis of archival data is well suited to trace the historical foundations 
on which legislators and political actors have endorsed and authorized legal fines and fees. The 
use of social network analysis is not new to studies on legislation and politicians. Prior research 
has used legislative records from the federal government (Fowler 2006a, 2006b) and state 
governments (Cho and Fowler 2010) in the same manner by connecting legislators who 
cosponsor together. Political scientists have used social network analysis to identify the 
centrality of legislators in a network (Fowler 2006), examine the role of gender and ethnicity in 
legislators’ decisions (Bratton and Rouse 2009), and analyze the significance of tie strength on 
legislative outcomes (Kirkland 2011). In the sociology of law, however, social network analysis 
has not been fully leveraged to link legislators for understanding changes to a set of criminal 
justice policies over time.  
I offer an account of how an ambiguously defined set of criminal justice policies was 
endorsed and enacted in legislation. Cosponsorship is interdependent, therefore it is treated as a 
network. Whether viewed as signaling or positioning on an issue, theoretical perspectives on 
cosponsorship recognize this behavior as being driven by the strategic calculation of costs 
involved with cooperation (Fowler 2006). I begin by descriptively mapping the Texas 
Legislature activity on legal fines and fees bills across 16 legislative sessions (Figure 2). Then, I 
test an alternate measure of centrality to assess the strength of legislator relationships (Table 3).  
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Figure 2. Legislative Sponsorship Ties in the Texas Legislature, 1985-2015 
 
Note: The figure was drawn using SocNetV, a data visualization software tool. The nodes for the 
top ten most connected legislators in the network are named. 
 
Figure 2 represents the policy network of the Texas Legislature on legal fines and fees 
legislation, where Democrats are black circles and Republicans are white squares. Each legislator 
represents a node in the network. A tie is drawn between each legislator who sponsors a bill and 
the legislator who authored that bill. Sponsorship represents support for another legislator’s bill, 
therefore these ties are directed and asymmetric. Larger nodes indicate higher levels of 
connectedness and wider ties indicate higher frequencies of sponsorship. Of the 182 total 
legislators in the network, there are 98 Republicans, 83 Democrats, and 1 Independent. 
Republican legislators more often sponsor with other Republicans; whereas Democratic 
legislators tend to sponsor with legislators from both parties. Given that the Texas Legislature 
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has been Republican-controlled for much of the time between 1985 and 2015, this suggests that 
Republican support is necessary to some degree for passing a bill on legal fines and fees.  
Table 1 presents the network values for degree density and degree centrality. The density 
measure captures the level of connectivity and ties among legislators in the network (Hanneman 
and Riddle 2011). In other words, the higher the density of this network, the more connected that 
members will be with regards to communication and information exchange. The degree 
centrality measure denotes the level of embeddedness and significance of a legislator in the 
network. This measure is calculated as the total number of unique cosponsors who support each 
legislator. The network density is much greater in earlier legislative sessions (not shown) where 
fewer legislators were involved. Over time, more legislators become involved with legal fines 
and fees legislation in the form of sponsorships. For example, during the 69th legislative session, 
there were two legislators involved with the sponsoring of four different legal fines and fees 
bills. By contrast, there were more than 50 legislators involved with 13 different bills during the 
74th legislative session.  
 
Table 1: Texas Legislature Network Descriptive Statistics 
Density Centrality 
.042 .135 
 
Although the degree centrality measure is reliable and supported by the literature 
(Hanneman and Riddle 2011), it overvalues legislators who have sponsored fewer bills, but 
among those bills, there were more legislators involved (Fowler 2006). For example, a legislator 
who has sponsored one bill with 30 other legislators will have a higher degree centrality 
compared with a legislator who has sponsored multiple bills with fewer legislators. Therefore, I 
use an alternative measure more suitable to determine the strength of legislative relationships. I 
use Fowler’s (2005) measure of connectedness, which is a weighted closeness centrality 
measure, to identify the legislators most involved with legal fines and fees legislation. Compared 
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with degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, and eigenvector centrality, 
the measure of connectedness uses information on the total number of cosponsors on each bill to 
gauge the strength of social relationships among legislators. To calculate the measure of 
connectedness, I begin by assuming the strength of a relationship between legislator a and 
legislator b on a given bill x is 1/cx.  Then, I create a binary indicator zxab (1 = legislator a 
cosponsors on a given bill x that is authored by legislator b). Using the binary indicator, I 
calculate the weighted quantity of bills that are cosponsored yab which will be the sum of 
zabx/cx. Given the asymmetrical nature of sponsorship ties (i.e. ties are directive), the weights 
will not be symmetrical. Appendix B illustrates how weights are calculated. To find 
connectedness, I calculate the inverse of the average of the distances between legislator a and all 
other legislators: (t – 1)/(d1j + d2j + d3j + ... + dxj). Figure 3 in the appendix depicts an example 
of this calculation. Using information on the total number of sponsors on a bill and the total 
number of bills sponsored by a pair of legislators, I can capture the level of support that a 
legislator gives and receives (see Table 2).  
Unsurprisingly, 7 of the 10 most connected legislators have served on criminal justice 
related committees and 8 of the 10 legislators represent highly populated districts in Texas, 
including Harris county. There are four Senate Democrats among the five most connected 
legislators. Overall, there are 5 Democrats and 5 Republicans. Based on this measure of 
connectedness, the most connected legislator is Senator John Whitmire, who is Chair of the 
Senate Criminal Justice Committee and has served in the Texas Legislature since 1973. During 
the period of 1985 to 2015 in this analysis, Whitmire’s level of connectedness may even be 
underestimated. Table 2 shows the clustering of the 10 most connected legislators. Some 
legislators are more well connected outside of this subset of the larger network. The second most 
connected legislator, Senator Zaffirini, is only connected to three of the other 10 most connected 
legislators. While she has given support through sponsorship to many legislators, support was 
not always reciprocated for her authored bills. Perspectives on legal influence may have 
competing ideas on the levels of influence among these legislators. The legislators in this group 
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represent committee chairs, congressional assistants, judges, university chancellors, board of 
trustee members, and lobbyists. Many have won legislative seats in general elections by margins 
of nearly 60 percent. Wentworth and Deuell, however, were unseated by “Tea Party” candidates 
in 2012 and 2014, respectively. 
 
Table 2: Connectedness of Texas Legislators  
Rank Legislator Chamber 
1 John Whitmire (D-15) Senate (formerly House) 
2 Judith Zaffirini (D-21) Senate 
3 Bob Deuell (R-2) Senate 
4 Kenneth Armbrister (D-18) Senate 
5 Royce West (D-23) Senate 
6 Brian McCall (R-66) House 
7 Juan Hinojosa (D-20) Senate (formerly House) 
8 Joan Huffman (R-17) Senate 
9 Jeff Wentworth (R-25) House (formerly Senate) 
10 Robert Duncan (R-28) House (formerly Senate) 
  
 23 
Chapter 5: Does Legislative Testimony Matter? 
The previous section identified the key legislators involved with legal fines and fees bills. 
This stage of the analysis directs attention to the involvement of other political actors, namely, 
individuals who provide testimony on bills. I argue that testimonies are directly influential on 
legal fines and fees policy. I offer a test as to whether this influence is dependent upon changing 
political opportunity structures, measured by a series of covariates over time. Following the 
standard for analyzing event count data, I use Poisson regression to model the count of legal 
fines and fees bills passed (Table 4). Continuous variables are centered to their means to address 
multicollinearity.  
 
MEASUREMENTS 
Dependent Variable 
Legislation 
I compile counts on the legislative bills related to the costs paid by defendants upon 
conviction (Slayton 2014). A bill is counted if it fits the following criteria: 1. It is attached to a 
legal statute in the Code of Criminal Procedure; 2. It is a criminal court cost paid by defendants 
upon conviction (e.g. DNA court cost); and 3. It was amended in law between 1985 and 2015.  
 
Independent Variables 
Legislative Testimony 
Presenting testimony to a legislature is a strategy used by outsiders to communicate with 
policy makers and influence decision-making (Weiss 1979). I focus on testimony to understand 
its importance for legislative outcomes. I argue that testimony is not solely a performative 
gesture, but an influential act on legislators’ policy preferences. Testimony is the most frequently 
used strategy among interest groups, but less is known about the degree of influence that 
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testimony may have on legislative activity. Moreland-Russell and her colleagues (2015) find 
evidence for an “enlightenment model” where legislators rely on testimony as a source of 
information on relevant issues. About six percent of their sample found testimony to be the 
primary factor driving a change of vote or position on an issue.  
I construct a count variable for legislative testimony indicating the number of testimonies 
provided on legal fines and fees bills during each legislation session. Each bill history contains 
witness lists, which include the individuals’ names and their organizations. Every individual 
providing testimony is given the option to deliver an oral presentation or a written statement, 
both of which are incorporated in the variable. Any individual who provides testimony on a 
single bill in both the House and the Senate is counted as having provided one testimony. I 
measure testimony as a variable capturing all testimonies, regardless of position. By law, state 
employees are not permitted to take a position in favor or in opposition to a bill, but rather must 
provide testimony as a resource witness with a neutral position. Most testimonies are provided 
by government organizations, such as police departments and courts. Therefore, any attempts to 
separately measure testimonies by position would underestimate the extent to which a bill is 
viewed favorably or not. Moreover, individuals may be more willing to provide testimony when 
they hold favorable attitudes towards a bill. This study is concerned with whether testimony of 
any kind is associated with legislative outcomes.  
 
Political Climate 
I use four different measures for the political climate. Research on criminal justice policy 
attitudes suggests that Republicans are more approving of punishment-oriented policies, 
therefore I expect that when Republicans have more control, there will be higher levels of 
testimonies. I use two measures to assess Republican political control, the proportion of 
Republican legislators (as a percentage) and whether there is an acting Republican governor (as a 
binary). In all legislative sessions, the proportion of Republican legislators is equal to or greater 
than the proportion of non-Republicans. These measures provide insight as to whether 
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organizations with conservative agendas, such as expanding legal fines and fees, are more 
willing to provide testimony when the legislature is Republican-controlled.  
Attitudes and concerns over budgets are influential for which bills get considered. For 
example, a legislature attempting to balance a tightening budget may be less willing to consider 
bills that support increased spending. I use House committee and Senate committee reports on 
session summaries and highlights that include information on whether there were budget 
constraints for criminal justice spending. Specifically, this binary measure identifies whether the 
House or the Senate described attending to criminal justice budget concerns during a legislative 
session. I anticipate that a legislature managing fiscal concerns will be associated with a rise in 
the rate of legal fines and fees legislation.   
I include a measure on the number of laws related to legal fines and fees that were passed 
in the previous legislative session. This lagged measure is a count of bills passed in the previous 
legislative session. Prior success with passing a legal fines and fees bill may hint that there are 
political opportunities to continue proposing similar bills.  
 
Public Opinion  
Democratic political theories contend that the strength of public opinion is a key 
determinant for policy change. Elected officials consistently support policies that align with the 
views of the public in order to stay in office. Thus, when the public opinion largely favors a 
policy, other factors such as legislative characteristics may become less significant. To capture 
the influence of public opinion, I include the percentage of people who mention “crime” as the 
most important issue in Gallup polls. These data are drawn from Policy Agendas, a project that 
collects and organizes archival data on the national political agenda and policy outcomes.  
Media attention is relevant for understanding the statewide conversation around a policy 
issue. I calculate an index on the annual percentage of articles in the Dallas Morning News, 
Houston Chronicle, and Austin American Statesman devoted to legal fines and fees. These are 
the three most circulated daily newspapers in Texas. This measure allows for testing the 
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argument that variation in legal fines and fees legislation may be a function of changes in the 
media attention surrounding legal fines and fees, rather than due to changes in testimony activity. 
 
Incarceration Rate 
Increases in the incarcerated population may be associated with increases in legislation, 
as a response to rising costs. I measure this variable using data from the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics for the incarcerated population rate per 1000. I use this measure to address whether 
fluctuations in the incarcerated population influence legislation on legal fines and fees.  
 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
To examine the influence of legislative testimony, I fit Poisson regression models that 
estimate the effects of predictors on the count of legal fines and fees laws. Poisson models are 
widely used for regression analysis on count data. I use the “offset” command to specify the log 
of the exposure time (Dean and Lawless 1987). This allows me to adjust for the opportunity 
there is for legal fines and fees bills to pass. The models include a logged variable for the 
exposure term with a coefficient value set to 1.  
I conducted exploratory analyses of the data to check for over-dispersion and 
multicollinearity among the covariates (Dean and Lawless 1987). Over-dispersion may lead to an 
underestimation of the standard errors. There was no evidence of over-dispersion in the event 
count variables, indicating that the variances of the event counts were not larger than their 
means. There was substantial multicollinearity among covariates, therefore, I center all 
continuous variables to their means. Analyses were computed using STATA MP. Table 3 
presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the variables.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Independent Variables 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Testimonies* 0 0.73 1        
Number of Laws*  0 9.30 0.25 1       
% of Newspaper Articles*  0 0.44 0.55 -.04 1      
% Crime is Most Important*  0 1.31 0.11 0.14 0.21 1     
Incarceration Rate per 1000* 0 11.40 0.88 0.12 -.11 0.81 1    
Republican Governor 0.7 0.52 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.12 1   
% Republicans in Legislature* 0 0.09 -.22 0.32 0.10 0.44 0.45 0.63 1  
Fiscal Concern 0.65 0.51 0.33 0.44 0.11 -.04 0.31 0.55 0.34 1 
Note: Variables denoted with an asterisk are lagged one legislative session and centered to their 
means. Means are set to zero. n = 17 
 
RESULTS 
Table 4 presents results for the relationships between the rate of legislation and the 
covariates. Models 2, 3, and 4 separately introduce a variable designed to capture the influence 
of the political climate. In all four models, testimonies have a significant positive effect on 
legislation, which is evidence in support of Hypothesis 4. This indicates that as the number of 
prior testimonies increases by a standard deviation over the mean, the rate of legislation 
increases. The coefficient for testimonies is .081 in Model 1. This indicates that the rate of legal 
fines and fees legislation increases by 6 percent as the number of legislative testimonies 
increases by one standard deviation above the mean. I arrive at this estimate through a two-step 
process. First, I calculate the product of the coefficient and the standard deviation for testimonies 
(0.081 * 0.73 = 0.05913). Second, I find the exponential value to rescale the impact 
(Exp[0.05913] = 1.06).  
The number of existing legal fines and fees laws is statistically significant in Model 1 and 
in Model 4. The coefficients in both models indicate a 7 percent increase in the rate of legal fines 
and fees legislation. This finding suggests that the passage of legislation does contribute to 
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increases in legislation in later sessions. As more laws become enacted, legislative activity 
around amending, introducing, or eliminating prior statutes becomes more frequent. 
Both public opinion and media attention show no significant effects of legislation, 
providing no evidence to support Hypothesis 1. Regarding public opinion, this is in accordance 
with theoretical explanations that legislators are not always responsive to the public. Conversely, 
this may indicate that legislators view legal fines and fees as separate from the public’s 
conceptions of criminal justice policy. Public concern over crime may be tied to ideas of public 
safety and victimization that are distant from legal fines and fees. Media attention, measured by 
an index of daily newspaper coverage, may have focused more other criminal justice policy 
issues unrelated to legal fines and fees. In earlier years, the public discourse on criminal justice 
was less pronounced. The effects remained insignificant with using a different measure that 
included national newspapers, such as The New York Times (results not shown). The influence 
of the incarceration rate is not statistically significant in the models, suggesting no support for 
Hypothesis 3b.  
In Model 2 and Model 3, indicators for Republican control of the legislature are included. 
For both measures, having a Republican governor in power and the percentage of seats filled by 
Republican legislators, the effects are not significant on legal fines and fees legislation, 
providing no evidence to support Hypothesis 2. This is consistent with findings from the 
previous section because legal fines and fees legislation is not predominantly mobilized by 
Republicans, therefore having either political party in power may have a similar influence.  
In Model 4, the effect for fiscal concern is significant and positive, suggesting that 
legislative sessions characterized by budgetary concerns increase the rate of legal fines and fees 
legislation. The coefficient indicates that the rate of legal fines and fees legislation increases 25 
percent during legislative sessions characterized by fiscal concern. This is in accordance with 
Hypothesis 3a and is consistent with the view that legal fines and fees are one avenue through 
which criminal justice system costs can be recouped. Although research and policy analysis 
suggest that there are long-term costs associated with the increased imposition of fines and fees, 
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policymakers may be more supportive of these policies for being a more immediate response to 
perceived fiscal constraints. Moreover, there may be fewer criminal justice policy alternatives 
that offer to reduce costs.  
 
Table 4: Legal Fines and Fees Legislation in Texas, 1985-2015 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Testimonies (t – 1) .081* .072* .082* .086* 
Number of Legal Fines and Fees Laws (t – 1) .009* .008 .008 .008* 
 
Percent of Newspaper Articles (t – 1) -.221 
 
-.204 
 
-.220 
 
-.224 
 
Percent Crime is Most Important (t – 1) -.003 
 
-.001 
 
-.001 
 
-.002 
 
Incarceration Rate per 1000 (t – 1) .102 
 
.114 
 
.112 
 
.119 
 
Republican Governor   .283 
 
 
 
 
Percent of Republicans in Legislature   -.223 
 
 
Fiscal Concern    .489* 
 
Constant -3.66*** 
 
-3.68*** 
 
-3.68*** 
 
-3.67** 
 
Pseudo R-square 
 
.48 .49 .48 .48 
Log Likelihood 
 
-108.9 -105.7 -105.9 -107.8 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p <.001.  
Poisson regression models produce estimates using standard robust errors  
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
The role of state social actors in expanding legislation on legal fines and fees is a 
consequential, yet understudied process. This study bridged the literatures on legislative 
networks and legal fines and fees to understand who contributed to an ambiguously defined set 
of laws and policies that disproportionately affect poorer justice-involved individuals. Further, it 
assessed whether and to what extent legislative testimony was associated with the laws. To 
examine the development of legal debt legislation in Texas, I constructed and analyzed the Texas 
Legislature as a policy network across a 30-year period. To summarize, there is a mix of 
Democratic and Republican legislators involved with authoring and sponsoring legal debt 
legislation. Using event count data, I find evidence for some, but not all, of my hypotheses. 
Legislative testimony, prior legislative bills, and fiscal concerns were positively associated with 
the passage of legal fines and fees legislation. From these findings, two themes emerge.  
The development of legal fines and fees statutes was a bipartisan effort over time. There 
is growing attention to the social and economic failings of legal fines and fees, and one 
assumption is that conservative lawmakers would be more invested in expanding these laws. In 
Texas, however, Democrats were no less tied to the legislation on legal fines and fees than 
Republicans. The findings do not necessarily suggest either political party dominated the input 
on legal debt legislation; however, support for legal fines and fees was a collaborative process. 
Scholarship on partisanship and criminal justice policy typically suggests that conservatives 
show greater support for punishment-oriented policies. The discourse, however, has been 
concerned with imprisonment as the primary social and economic development in criminal 
justice. Incarceration and prison expansion were heavily politicized issues leveraged by 
conservatives as solutions to concerns over public safety. Legal fines and fees, in theory, are a 
less punitive response to crime. Individuals are mandated to pay the costs associated with 
criminal justice activities. The logic of fines and fees satisfies the concerns of both political 
parties. As both a response to criminality, by holding individuals accountable, and to budget 
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concerns, by recouping the cost of criminal justice activities, legal fines and fees are palatable to 
both political parties. In recent years, the rhetoric on criminal justice policy has shifted towards a 
“smart-on-crime” approach (Simon 2010). Whether and how this different approach to criminal 
justice addresses the consequences of using legal fines and fees to punish more individuals and 
punish more severely is an open question.   
Legislative testimony matters. It is associated with a 6 percent increase in the passage of 
legal fines and fees legislation. Preparing and presenting testimony is a strategic form of 
communicating with lawmakers to influence policy preferences and decisions. Many policy 
issues are brought to the attention of legislators through testimony. An alternative explanation for 
the positive effect may be that organizations and individuals offer testimony for bills that are 
likely to pass. Another explanation is that testimony has an indirect effect by providing 
information and arguments used by legislators during floor debates, where policy decisions are 
determined. Future research can be done to assess these ideas and examine for whom testimony 
is more effective, based on personal characteristics of the testifiers and the legislators.  
The implications of this study for the socio-legal literature are significant. By 
demonstrating the diversity of legislators involved with legal fines and fees legislation, my work 
contributes a starting point for using descriptive and quantitative methods to study state-level 
legislative bodies. My account suggests that the broader political climate in a state does not 
determine policy outcomes. Moreover, my study suggests that changes in the political 
environment can, but do not always, structure the attainability of goals and outcomes for certain 
actors. The efforts by Democratic legislators to authorize legal fines and fees bills were not 
stifled by being part of a Republican-heavy legislature. There may be increases in legislative 
testimony when social actors’ goals align with the political structures. Deeper analysis on the 
contents of interactions and behaviors among state actors would be necessary to build our 
understanding on legislative outcomes.  
Scholars, policymakers, and practitioners are considering new ways of addressing legal 
fines and fees (Beckett and Harris 2011; Ruback 2011; Marsh and Gerrick 2015). In 2014, The 
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Office of Court Administration (OCA) conducted an assessment on the use of legal fines and 
fees in Texas. This assessment was mandated by Senate Bill 1908 in preparation for the 84th 
legislative session. The report marked the first comprehensive analysis of the size, scale, and 
purpose of legal fines and fees in Texas (Slayton 2014). The OCA examined whether legal 
statutes on fines and fees were necessary to achieve their stated statutory purposes. Findings 
showed numerous legal fines and fees lacking stated statutory purposes. The researchers 
identified 14 costs with unclear statutory purposes and 4 costs that were unnecessary to achieve 
their statutory purposes (Slayton 2014). Moreover, the collections from certain legal fines and 
fees were found to not be reliably used for criminal justice-related purposes.  
The findings were used in consultation with 26 local government representatives 
including attorneys, district and county clerks, non-profit government groups, and judicial 
associations to provide recommendations to the Texas Legislature. Table 5 in the appendix 
includes the names and represented organizations in attendance. Members of this group have 
provided testimony on legal fines and fees bills in the past. Being invited to consult on policy 
recommendations is a sign of influence. It remains an empirical question whether the act of 
providing testimony builds credibility that can lead to gaining more influence.  
There are limitations in this study that can guide future directions. Failed bills were 
omitted from the analyses due to inconsistencies in the available information. The data used for 
analyses incorporated full information on bill histories, which for failed bills, are short and 
abrupt depending on the stage at which the bill died. For example, a bill may only be considered 
in the House before receiving too few votes to be passed to the Senate for further consideration. 
This bill would likely not have been heard in testimony nor would it have received legislator 
support. Some failed bills reemerge and find success in later legislative sessions. First, because 
of data limitations, I am not able to examine bills related to legal fines and fees that failed to 
pass. Legislative efforts may have been proposed to decrease or eliminate certain legal fines and 
fees. The failure of these efforts may point to weaker legislative influence among its authors and 
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sponsors or stronger legislative influence among its opponents. Future studies can use archival 
and qualitative methods to investigate failed bills as negative cases.  
This study is specific to Texas, an outlier state on many criminal justice procedures and 
outcomes. Although partisanship was not directly associated with legal fines and fees legislation 
in Texas, states with balanced or liberal-leaning legislatures may have different trajectories. 
Moreover, macro-level structural differences, such as economic conditions and crime rates, will 
affect legislators’ objectives. As scholars have argued, the conditions observed in each state are 
unique and relatively incomparable to other states. Although, there are certain states, like Texas, 
that are viewed as national models for criminal justice policy. Other state legislatures may 
choose to adopt similar policies and practices. Future studies can explore other states, such as 
Louisiana or New York, where legislatures and interest groups may behave differently with 
approaches to legal fines and fees. The Oklahoma legislature, for example, has recently approved 
numerous pieces of legislation aimed at diminishing the penalties for owing legal debt and 
expanding the opportunities for repayment.  
A review of the witness lists shows that judicial and prosecutorial organizations provided 
favorable testimonies on legislation that introduced or increased legal fines and fees. The few 
testimonies in opposition were provided by progressive organizations such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union. As Gottschalk (2006) argues, the desires of certain groups to achieve policy 
goals does not necessarily translate into success. Deeper investigation into oral and written 
testimony transcripts and records can be used to examine the variety of institutional, political, 
and structural factors that facilitate or block interest groups to help understand when and under 
what circumstances opposition to legal fines and fees is weaker or more effective.  
Through an examination of the Texas Legislature, my study contributes a novel socio-
legal perspective on penal policy developments. Legal fines and fees in Texas have developed as 
a seemingly innocuous set of policies focused on accountability and cost-savings. Prior work has 
examined the consequences of legal fines and fees, whereas this study investigated the legal 
development over time in a state legislature. By investigating legal records on fines and fees in 
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Texas, my analyses offer unique information for theoretical models explaining the roles of state 
actors in developing public policies that are implicated in widespread social inequalities. 
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Appendix 
Figure 3. Example for Calculating Weighted Sponsorship Distance 
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Table 5. Local Government Representatives Consulted by OCA, 2014 
Name Organization 
Jim Allison County Judges and Commissioners Association 
Bob Bass County Judges and Commissioners Association 
Steve Bresnen El Paso County 
Michelle Brinkman Travis County District Clerk 
Loretta Cammack Nacogdoches County District Clerk 
Robby Chapman Texas Municipal Court Training Center 
Hon. David Cobos Justice of the Peace and Constables Association 
Patricia Cummings Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association 
John Dahill Conference of Urban Counties 
Rob Daniel Texas Justice Court Training Center 
Richard Dulany Bexar County Public Defender 
Shannon Edmonds Texas District and County Attorneys Association 
Nanette Forbes Texas Association of Counties 
Laura Garcia Texas Association of Counties 
Marc Hamlin Brazos County District Clerk 
Jim Huggler Attorney, Tyler 
Teresa Kiel Guadalupe County Clerk 
David R. Lee Attorney, Houston 
Hon. Greg Magee Texas Justice Court Judges Association 
Cynthia Mitchell Denton County Clerk 
Carl Reynolds Council of State Governments 
Joshua Tackett Navarro County District Clerk 
Ryan Turner Texas Municipal Court Education Center 
Laura Weiser Texas Center for the Judiciary 
Caroline Woodburn Potter County District Clerk 
Bryan Zubay Texas Fair Defense Project 
Source: Adapted from Office of Court Administration, 2014.  
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